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Even	prior	to	the	official	start	of	the	Trump	presidency	in	January	2017,	Taiwan	
has	received	attention	from	the	then	US	President-elect	Trump	as	he	received	a	
congratulatory	telephone	call	from	President	Tsai	Ing-Wen.		That	phone	call	was	
heard	around	the	world	as	it	broke	ranks	with	the	usual	quiet	approaches	of	the	
past.		The	next	four	years	showed	the	Trump	administration	‘talking	up’	and	
actively	engaging	with	Taiwan	while	‘talking	down’	and		confrontational	to	
China,	e.g.,	the	trade	war,	South	China	Seas,	etc.		Taiwan	finally	felt	that	there	is	a	
US	president	willing	to	take	their	side.		Indeed,	Taipei	Times	on	October	19	
reported	that	a	YouGov	survey	showing	Taiwan	is	alone	in	Asia-Pacific	where	
majority	of	the	respondents	are	favorable	to	Republican	Donald	Trump	than	to	
Democrat	Joe	Biden.		With	the	now	concluded	US	presidential	election	won	by	
Joe	Biden	with	306	electoral	college	votes	and	the	most	votes	ever	(over	80	
million)	by	a	winning	presidential	candidate	in	US	history,	many	are	scrambling	
to	read	the	tea	leaves	for	what	it	means	for	Taiwan.			
	
It	is	important	to	be	reminded	that	US-Taiwan	relations	is	built	on	the	
foundation	of	an	American	law	–	the	Taiwan	Relations	Act	of	1979	(TRA).		This	is	
a	unique	law	as	it	defines	the	United	States’	multifaceted	commitment	to	Taiwan.		
TRA	has	remained	the	bedrock	of	US-Taiwan	relations	that	has	underpinned	
Taiwan’s	security	and	stability	despite	its	increasing	formal	diplomatic	isolation	
in	the	global	stage.		TRA,	I	argue,	does	not	only	define	US-Taiwan	relations,	but	
equally	important,	has	also	outlined	the	nature	of	US-China	relations	and	cross-
Straits	relations.		So,	despite	the	public	perception	of	the	seeming	ups	and	downs	
of	US-Taiwan	relations	in	the	past	40	years,	the	reality	is	the	US-Taiwan	relations	
is	stable	and	strong.	
	
So	what	can	Taiwan	expect	from	the	Biden	administration?		First	things	first,	the	
erratic,	disjointed,	go-it-alone,	‘America	First’	nature	of	US	foreign	policy	is	out.		
As	an	old	hand	in	foreign	affairs	himself,	Biden	has	signaled	–	with	his	cabinet	
appointments	for	foreign	affairs	and	national	security	–	that	a	more	nuanced,	
consultative,	and	more	deliberative	foreign	policy	will	be	the	norm.		Taiwan	
might	feel	some	‘withdrawal	symptoms’	from	the	‘sugar-high’	four	years	of	the	
Trump	presidency	as	the	US	will	play	the	Taiwan	card	less	obviously	and	less	
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explicitly.		The	hullaballoo	in	US-Taiwan	relations	under	Trump	will	quiet	down	
markedly	but	it	does	not	mean	that	Taiwan	has	become	less	important.		Taiwan,	
after	all,	is	an	important	part	of	the	first	island	chain	in	the	US	Indo-Pacific	
security	strategy.	
	
Let	us	remind	ourselves	of	the	three	grand	strategies	of	American	foreign	policy	
–	neo-isolationism,	liberal	internationalism,	and	American	primacy.		The	third	
strategy	–	American	primacy	–	is	not	questioned	across	US	presidential	
administrations.		The	tumultous	past	four	years	is	an	example	of	clumsy	neo-
isolationist	experimentation.		In	a	president	Biden,	we	can	expect	a	collective	
approach	that	underpins	the	liberal	internationalism	strategy.		That	is,	effective	
American	leadership	is	an	invitation	to	collective	action.		American	allies	and	
partners	in	the	region,	therefore,	can	expect	to	be	called	upon	to	act	collectively	
to	manage,	deal,	and	confront	regional	political,	security,	economic,	and	
environmental	issues.			
	
The	more	successful	the	Biden	administration	is	in	leading	from	the	front	and	
bringing	along	regional	allies,	the	stronger	and	more	stable	the	collective	
security	(in	a	broad	sense)	community	will	be.		This	commitment	to	
multilateralism	of	the	future	Biden	administration	is	not	only	in	the	security	
sphere	but	also	the	commitment	to	multilateral	organizations	as	well	as	to	the	
WTO	and	the	free-trade	regime.		As	a	trade-dependent	state,	Taiwan	will	benefit	
from	renewed	American	engagement	in	multilateralism,	especially	in	regional	
and	global	trade	arrangements,	as	it	finds	itself	locked	out	of	the	recently	signed	
Regional	Comprehensive	Economic	Partnership	(RCEP)	and	still	unable	to	make	
headway	in	the	Comprehensive	and	Progressive	Agreement	for	Trans-Pacific	
Partnership	(CPTPP).		Yes,	Taiwan	will	feel	less	‘in	the	news’	but	it	does	not	
equate	to	being	‘left	out	in	the	cold.’		Instead,	Taiwan	should	interpret	Biden’s	
belief	in	leadership	through	collective	action	and	multilateralism	as	an	even	
clearer	statement	of	the	stability	and	reliability	of	US	commitment	to	its	allies	
and	partners	(including	Taiwan,	of	course).		
	
Within	the	US,	there	is	a	strong	bipartisan	consensus	that	China	is	a	systemic	
challenger	to	American	global	primacy.		While	the	incoming	Biden	
administration	will	be	more	nuanced	in	managing	Sino-US	relations,	China	will	
not	find	respite	from	US	pressure	to	hold	it	accountable.		There	will	be	no	
backtracking	there.		One	very	likely	difference	between	the	Trump	and	Biden	
approaches	is	that	there	will	be	better	‘buy-in’	from	allies	and	partners	as	the	US	
leads	in	coordinated	and	collective	efforts	to	hold	China	accountable,	
consequently,	reducing	China’s	ability	to	drive	a	wedge	between	US	and	its	allies.			
	
Cross-straits	relations	is	likely	to	remain	unchanged	as	it	is	primarily	driven	by	
domestic	electoral	politics	in	Taiwan	and	internal	party	politics	in	China.		China’s	
stubborn	insistence	on	its	version	of	one-China	policy	and	Taiwan’s	adamant	
refusal	to	accede	–	assisted	by	events	in	Hong	Kong	and	supported	by	even	
stronger	Taiwanese	identity	–	ensures	that	cross-Straits	relations	remain	‘cold’	
and	‘tense.’		To	the	extent	that	Sino-US	relations	affects	cross-Strait	relations	in	a	
Biden	administration	depends	on	i)	how	China	reacts	to	more	coordinated	US-
led	efforts	to	hold	it	to	account;	and	ii)	the	propensity	and	appetite	of	the	US	to	
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play	the	so-called	‘Taiwan	card.’		In	any	event,	as	a	frontline	state	Taiwan	can	
expect	that	pressure	from	the	PRC	is	unlikely	to	abate	anytime	soon	thereby	
ensuring	‘cold’	and	‘tense’	cross-Strait	relations	to	continue.		However,	Biden’s	
commitment	to	rebuilding	alliance	relations	–	weakened	by	Trump’s	‘America	
First’	of	the	past	four	years	–	means	that	Taiwan	is	more	likely	to	feel	the	
‘warmth’	of	the	collective	security	blanket	provided	by	a	stable	and	reliable	US-
led	regional	security	and	economic	framework.	
		
	
	
